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Executive summary. 
Japan, a super-aging country. It has the highest percentage of elderly population in the 
world of 26% as in 2014. The decline of the birth rate and subsequent population drop result 
from the imbalance between the younger generation and the older generation. It is facing a 
demographic crisis with high potential of the economic threat. The demographic change resulting 
a reduction in overall consumption power in japan and left japan will lower revenue to support 
their society. This paper examines the possible contributing factors, which discover the equal 
access of education opportunity post world war, increasingly expensive education costs and the 
challenge faced by contemporary parents to raise children would be the reasons for the decline of 
the child births. Also, provide two alternative policies that would be useful for the Japanese 
government, the immigration reform and the family incentives policies. Due to historical and 
cultural constraints, Japan is unable to import a significant number of immigrants into the 
countries. So far, the family’s incentive policies are not effective to achieve the mission of 
encouraging more birth, but instead created some barrier for women to raise a child. In order to 
be more effective alleviate the issue, the combination of the two policy tools is essential and also 
make the certain change of the two policies. 
The Significance and Impact of Japan’s Demographic Shift  
As early as the 1970s, Japan started to experience sub-replacement fertility rates. This 
means that, due to declines in the overall birth rate among Japanese women, the current 
generation is less populous than the previous generation. The number of children born per 
woman has declined steadily over the last four decades and reached a new low of one point 
twenty six (1.26) births in 2005.  While that number has inched up slowly (In 2013, the latest 
year for which full data is available it was one point forty three) (1.43) it is currently well below 
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the two point one (2.1) births per woman required to maintain current population levels. (World 
Bank, 2016) At the same time, Japan has started to experience a sharp decline in adult mortality 
rates. The older generation has been growing in number since new medical technologies have 
improved the overall health, longevity and life expectancy of its current population (World 
Health Organization, 2011).  
The decline of the birth rate and subsequent population drop, along with decreases in 
mortality rates among the elderly population, has combined to create a society that is aging at 
unprecedented speed. Now, Japan is considered a super aging society. It has the highest 
percentage of elderly population in the world, 23% in 2009, which continues to grow (Statistics 
Bureau, 2010). The development of this demographic shift directly impacts every aspect of 
Japanese society. As the cost of social support and benefits for these elders is increasing, the 
workforce is shrinking. That means that there is an imbalance between the younger generation 
(who can help provide support) and the older generation (who need support). The Japanese 
government must shoulder the increasing financial burden of these trends and create new 
strategies to deal with this critical issue. They understand that the demographic changes and 
resulting reduction in overall consumption power in Japan will mean decreased revenue to 
provide essential support systems for an aging society.  
This paper focuses on the change in Japan’s demographic patterns post Second World 
War to present day.  It provides a closer look at past, current and future trends in the total 
population of Japan and for each age group. The demographic change is of great importance to 
Japan because healthy population growth may determine the strength of the country’s economic 
foundation and has a direct impact on the country’s potential for economic propensity in the near 
future. Population decline is a serious issue for many developed countries including Japan. The 
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demographic shift in the age of its populace is also a central issue. The government will have to 
deal with the impact of these demographic shifts on a national scale. However, in order to 
alleviate the issue, it is crucial to understand the contributing factors that triggered the decline of 
the birth rate after the Second World War and led to the aging of the population. The Japanese 
government also needs to understand the negative and positive economic consequences that the 
country will face if the demographic trends continue to move in this direction.  
Once the contributing factors to the change in the Japanese demographic structure are 
identified, and their economic consequences both for the present and the future are understood, it 
may then be possible to identify effective policy alternatives that the Japanese government can 
use to remedy the situation. Two potential policy alternatives that have been used in many 
countries to address declining populations are immigration reform and pro-family or family 
incentive policies. Immigration policy has been used as a tool by many Western countries, such 
as the United States, Canada, and Australia, to address labor shortages. However, immigration 
reform has not been a popular strategy in Japan. Japan is one of the most homogenous, least 
ethnically diverse countries in the developed world and only a very small percentage of its 
current population is foreign born. To date, Japan has favored longer term family incentive 
policies, which aim to encourage Japanese couples to raise more children by providing various 
family care incentives. Rather than relying on immigrants to boost the fertility rate, they want to 
encourage young Japanese couples to have more than one child.  
The History of the Demographical Shift  
From 1945, the year the Second World War formally ended after the Empire of Japan 
unconditionally surrendered to the allied troops, to the present day, Japan has experienced two 
short baby booms. Japanese researchers Minoru Tachi and Yoichi Okazaki have stated that 
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between the years of 1947 to 1949, when Japan was in its post-war recovery period and soldiers 
were returning home and fathering children, Japan experienced it first short baby boom. The 
researchers estimate that the annual birth count exceeded two point six (2.6) million in each of 
these two years (1969, 170). The second baby boom happened in 1971 once the children from 
that first baby boom of 1947-1949 reached adulthood, but the number of births per woman did 
not increase (Muramatsu and Akiyanma, 2011). 
The birth rate continued to decline for several reasons. First the Japanese government 
tried to control any potential overpopulation by encouraging family planning and birth control 
and by relaxing abortion laws.  Secondly, Japan experienced a significant economic 
transformation from 1945-1951 when General Douglas MacArthur, who oversaw the occupation 
of Japan, created sweeping changes in the nation. As Japan became less of an agricultural society 
and more an industrialized nation, the perceived value of children changed. In an agricultural 
economy, children bring greater economic benefits to a family since they provide free labor to 
work the land. In essence, children were assets and the more children people had, the better off 
they were. However, in a highly-industrialized world this principle no longer holds true. Children 
have less economic value. Indeed children become “cost-centers” rather than assets because 
parents need to financially invest in their children to secure their future. Children are expensive 
commodities in that they have to be fed, clothed nurtured and sent to school so they might get a 
decent job. With more children parents face heavier cost burdens and many parents do not have 
the means to make multiple investments in human capital (Boling, 1997, 194). 
 As the Supreme Commander of Allied Power (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur was 
charged with helping the Japanese government rebuild the country after the war. His priorities 
during the occupation of Japan were to decentralize the militarization in the Japanese 
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government, create free markets and promote Western ideas.  MacArthur prohibited former 
military officers from participating in any form of governmental decision-making process (U.S 
Department of State, Office of the Historian Milestones: 1945-1952). He also sought to facilitate 
economic demilitarization by banning the production of military weapons. The new constitution 
for postwar Japan of 1949 stated that Japan must never create a military force and must rely on 
its allies to protect the country from outside threats.  
The exclusion of national military forces in Japan, allowed the country to reserve the 
defense spending to invest in economic development (Takada, 1999, 6-7). General MacArthur 
introduced economic reforms that benefitted numerous tenant farmers and broke apart big 
business to transform the economy into a free market capitalist system. Also MacArthur 
promoted the Western idea of gender equality and greater freedoms for women (U.S Department 
of State, Office of the Historian Milestones: 1945-1952).  This helped support the new free 
market economy, because it encouraged more women to enter the Japanese workforce and this 
helped meet labor demands.  With less military spending, more economic development and a 
labor force known for its incredible work ethic, Japan was able to boost its economy shortly after 
the war. As japan grown from a devastated country after Second World War and became second 
largest economy after the 1960s. 
As illustrated in Table 1, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Japan 
dramatically increased.  In 1975, Japan’s GPD per capita was only about 4,600 dollars, but only 
ten years later it had almost tripled to 11,000 dollars. The GDP per capita was to keep rising, 
becoming an average of 40,000 dollars after 1995 (World Bank). However, as the economy 
grew, and incomes began to rise, Japan began to experience a decrease in its population. The 
chart shows this negative correlation.  
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Table 1 
 
Sources: the GDP per capita is from the World Bank, and the total population and Rate of 
Population change are taking from Japanese Statistic Bureau, MIC; Ministry of Health, Laborer 
and Welfare; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as included in the Japan 
Statistics Handbook of 2015.  
 
The growth charted in Table 1 led to the changes charted in Figure 1, where we see the 
population ratio at each age level. Figure 1 illustrates a clearer picture of demographic trends in 
three age groups. The makeup of the population in 1950 was in the shape of a pyramid, where 
the child age group from zero to fourteen (0-14) year old is at the base with the largest 
percentage share, followed by people aged from 15-64 and with the elderly population 
representing the smallest percentage. The population ratio changes quite a bit in 2014, when the 
child age population shrinks from 35.4% to 12.8%.  The elderly population grows from four 
point nine percent (4.9%) in 1950 to 26% in 2014 (Statistical Handbook of Japan 2015, chapter 
2 Population). 
According to the most recent projections, the percentage ratio will continue to shift. It 
will become more of a top down pyramid in 2050. The elderly population, at 38.8% will become 
the second largest population and children will only represent about nine point sixth percent 
(9.6%) of the total population. To put this into perspective, when we compare Japan to other 
countries, we can more see the singularity and significance of such change. “In 2010, the 
Japan GDP per Capita ($) Total Popuation (1,000) Rate of Population Change (%)
1975 4,600 111,940 1.35
1980 9,300 117,060 0.9
1985 11,000 121,049 0.67
1990 25,000 123,611 0.42
1995 43,000 125,570 0.31
2000 37,000 126,926 0.21
2005 36,000 127,768 0.13
2010 43,000 128,057 0.05
2014 36,000 127,083 -0.17
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percentage of the population 65 and older in Japan was 23.0%, exceeding the U.S. (13.1%), 
France (16.8%), Sweden (18.2%), and Italy (20.4%), indicating that the aging society in Japan is 
progressing rapidly as compared to the U.S. and European countries” (Statistical Handbook of 
Japan 2015, chapter 2 Population). 
In 2010, Japan had one of the lowest numbers in terms of its child population of 13.2%. 
Among these countries, the age of its working-age group is average. However, Japan has the 
largest elderly population of 23% of all the other developed counties.  In the population 
projections of 2050, the child population is down to nine point seven percent (9.7%). The main 
workforce age group 15-64 will also decline from 61.3% to 51.5%, and elderly population will 
be the highest at 38.8% (Statistical Handbook of Japan 2015, chapter 2 Population). 
Figure 1 
 
 
Education Participation in Post War Japan  
The Japanese New Cabinet was formed under the auspices of the Allied Powers in 1945. 
Under this new cabinet, a new constitution was drafted with provisions for equal rights for 
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women. These provisions would not only ensure that both genders shared an equal playing field 
in society, but would also promote and increase a new source of human capital. As Japan was 
transformed to an industrialized country and experienced rapid expansion in its production and 
development, the country needed more workers in order to meet the growing demand for labor. 
The new constitution included an extension of universal voting rights, allowing Japanese women 
who were at least 20 years old, to vote for the very first time. At the same time, an act known as 
the Guideline for the Renovation of Woman’s Education stated that there must be equal 
educational opportunities for women. In the prewar years, women simply aspired to become 
good wives and mothers. Education was not considered relevant in those roles. A woman’s 
access to education was therefore limited and any education she might receive was often of poor 
quality. The new constitution delivered not only equal access to education and to educational 
quality, it also stipulated that there should be mutual respect between men and women who 
wanted to pursue higher education (Saito, 2014, 8-9). 
In order to successfully implement equal access to education, the Japanese government 
eliminated the regulatory barriers that prevented a woman from pursuing higher education. 
Women’s universities and coeducational universities were established along with all-girl high 
schools. Educational standards at middle schools for girls were brought up to the level of those 
for boys. Faculty positions in universities were opened to qualifying women. In order for the 
ideal of equal education to be realized, the Japanese government took practical and necessary 
steps to ensure that women were prepared to succeed in school from the earliest ages.  They 
overhauled the kindergarten and early education systems and adopted the principle of 
coeducation at all school levels (Saito, 2014, 9). 
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As this “Renovation” was enforced, the percentage of female students in high school 
increased significantly. In the early 1950’s, 48% of boys and 36.7% of girls advanced from 
middle school to high school. By 1958, the gender gap had closed significantly with 56.2% of 
boys and 51.1% of girls entering high schools. Then in 1969, the advancement rates for women 
surpassed boys, as 79.2% of boys and 79.5% of girls continued their studies in high school 
(Saito, 2014, 10). By the late1990s, almost all women who completed a middle school education 
would advance to high school (Shirahase, 2000, 49). 
The new system for higher education began in 1949 with the basic mandate that there 
should be at least one coeducational university in each prefecture. Of course, the number of 
coeducation universities would increase in later years.  A junior college system was established 
with a greater emphasis on general education. In the early years of education reform, many 
women preferred the shorter two-year commitment of a junior college since they thought it 
would be easier and certainly much more cost-effective than a university education. Indeed the 
female student percentage in junior colleges expanded rapidly from 67.5% in 1960 to 78.8% in 
1970 and to 89% in 1980, eventually reaching 91.5% in 1990.  Female enrollment in universities 
also increased, but at a relatively slow rate compared to junior college. Percentages grew from 
12.4% enrollment in 1955 to around 20-25% from 1975 to 1980 (Saito, 2014, 10). However, by 
1996 those trends had shifted.  In 1997, women's university enrollment reached 26% compared 
to 23% enrollment in junior college (Shirahase, 2000, 49). Today women are still more likely to 
enroll in a university than a junior college and in recent years, the enrollment ratio of female 
students in university had jumped from 32.3% in 1995 to about 41.1% in 2010 (Saito, 2014, 10-
11). 
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 The series of actions that the Japanese government undertook to help women access 
higher education, move forward in their desired career and enrich their lifestyle, had profound 
impacts on society as a whole and on families in particular. According to the Becker, (1981) and 
Willis, (1994) stated now families understood that they were expected to invest in their children 
and provide them with a quality education (Suzuki, 2006, 6). But over the years, the rising costs 
of both public and private educational institutions have become a heavy burden for parents to 
carry. Over the years, as enrollment rates of high school, junior college and universities have 
risen, so have the costs. A recent educational, financial survey conducted by the educational 
policy institute based in Washington D.C and Toronto demonstrated that of 15 developed 
countries they surveyed, Japanese students carry the heaviest university financial burden 
(Akahata, 2006). 
In today’s Japan, national universities charge each student about 820,000 yen (8,200  US 
dollars) yearly tuition, and private universities on average charge students about 1,310,000 yen 
($13,100  US dollars). Since 1970, the cost of university has increased more than 51 times in 
national universities and about six times in private institutions. About 70 percent of Japanese 
students are attending private universities because national universities have limited space and 
accept fewer entrants. Parents and students are responsible for almost all of the educational costs. 
Scholarships are very limited and even were a student to get a scholarship, he or she would likely 
have to repay it. In Japan, “scholarships” often charge interest and operate more like U.S. student 
loans (Akahata, 2006). As a result, Japanese parents face a serious burden when it comes to their 
children’s educational costs (Suzuki, 2006, 7). 
The Tension between Work and Family 
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Young Japanese people having grown up in a period of rapid economic expansion and 
having been highly educated, they have very high aspirations when it comes to their future lives. 
They believe that if they work hard, and put in long hours, they can increase their chances of 
getting a good job with prospects for promotion. However, as the global economy faltered, Japan 
suffered economic hardships around the 1990s and 2008. The unemployment rate increased from 
two percent (2%) in 1990 to five percent (5%) in 2003. It declined slightly and jumped again to 
five percent (5%) from 2008 to 2010. Figure 2 from the Statistical Handbook of Japan 2015 
shows unemployment rate pattern from 1986 to 2014. It indicates the ratio of jobs that are open 
to the number of job seekers and it shows the unemployment rate. As we can see, the number of 
people who want to work far exceeds the low supply of jobs that are available to the job seekers. 
(Suzuki, 2006, 7). 
Figure 2  
 
The economic downturn has had a significant impact on labor market conditions and has 
certainly not given Japanese youth the ability to realize many of their career ambitions. Their 
ability to obtain a stable and secure job dropped from 77.8% in 1988 to 55.8% in 2004, and the 
number of people in the part time or temporary workforce increased from nine point four percent 
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(9.4%) to 24.6% in the same period (Suzuki, 2006, 7). According to Easterlin, 1979 and Yamada, 
1999, young workers who are saddled with student debt and who are finding it hard to achieve 
their expected standard of living will hesitate to get married and start a family (Suzuki, 2006, 7). 
Therefore, more young people are postponing marriage. As C. Ueno in a 1998 report showed, 
education reform and the growth of educational opportunities for women also put pressure on the 
job market because it made it more acceptable for women to work outside of the home, and 
obtain a professional position (Shirahase, 2000, 48). In the latter part of the 20th century, we saw 
an increase in women’s economic power as women pursued education, expanded their career 
opportunities, and held more important positions in the workforce. This also impacted population 
trends as more women delayed marriage and children to focus on their career. Indeed Japan’s 
National Institute of the Population and Social Security Research report of 1998 found that 
women in their twenties who have a higher education tend to shift their focus to career goals 
rather than pursue marriage. The rise of the working woman in Japan has also had other 
consequences. When working women do marry, they face higher divorce rates due to conflict 
over the gender-based division of labor in regard to raising children (Becker, 1991, 135-154). As 
demonstrated in Figure 3 collected from the Statistical Handbook of Japan 2015, marriage and 
divorce trends, show significantly different patterns over the decades. In the 1970s, we can see 
high marriage rates and low divorce rates. Over the years, marriage rates decline sharply while 
the divorce rate steadily increases.  
In 1990, according to Robert D. Retherford, Naohiro Ogawa & Satomi Sakamoto, 1996, 
presented the average marriage age of a Japanese couple was 28.4 for a man and 25.9 for a 
woman, only surpassed by Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark (Boling, 1998, 
174). Table 2, also presented from the Statistical Handbook of Japan 2015, shows the average 
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age increase of first marriages for Japanese couples over time. From 1950 to 2013, the rates for 
both men and women have increased steadily. In the early 1970s, men married by the age of 
25.9.  By 2013, the marriage age had increased to almost 31-year-s old.  In women the increase 
in marriage age is even more profound. In the 1950s women were likely to marry at 23, which is 
just one point three (1.3) years younger than the age at which a man might marry. In 2013 
women are more likely to marry when they are almost 30. As the age rates have increased both 
for men and women, the gap between the average age of a man and woman remains more 
consistent. In 2013 it is one point six (1.6) years.  
Figure 3 
 
Table 2 
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With marriage age increasing along with divorce rates the National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research shows that throughout the later decades of the 20th 
century and the beginning of the 21st century, Japan experienced a serious decline in the total 
births of children. The drop in birth rates started in the early 1950s, continued to the mid-1980s 
and then accelerated. By the 1970s it had fallen below the population replacement rate of two 
point one (2.1) children per woman. These figures suggest a negative correlation between the 
increasing advancement of women admitted into higher education studies and the decrease of the 
number of children are being born (Shirahase, 2000, 49-50). 
The Challenges of Marriage and Childbearing in Contemporary Japan  
According to Robert D. Retherford, Naohiro Ogawa & Satomi Sakamoto, 1996 stated 
most young people in modern societies, are not in a rush to settle down.  They want to enjoy 
their youth and the freedom it brings. They also understand practical realities such as the need to 
save money in order to afford the expensive down payment on a condominium or house before 
marriage. It is very costly to begin married life in Japan, especially for women, In Japan the costs 
can be calculated not just in terms money but also in opportunity.  In the current working 
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environment in Japan, professional women who going to have a child or had a child are more 
likely to be sidelined at work. They are expected to have the majority role in childrearing and 
become stay-at-home home moms (Boling, 1998, 174-175). According to a study published by 
Retherford, Ogawa and Sakamoto in 1996, women not only have to figure out how to juggle 
work and family, they also have to commit to raising their children almost single-handedly. They 
will have very little help raising their children as fathers in Japan are often absent when it comes 
to the practicalities of childcare. Women will therefore be asked to find the time and energy for 
their jobs and for their families (Boling, 1998, 174-175). 
The contemporary urban environment of Japan also presents difficulties that may 
constrain a young couple’s ability to raise a family.  According to Higuchi, Marumoto, Yanson 
and Domoto (1991), the majority of couples can only afford to live in very small apartments 
where there is little room to raise children (Boling, 1998, 175). In addition the urban 
infrastructure is not set up for families. There are a limited number of public parks where 
children can play, and the ability to find spaces to play with other children is also limited 
(Boling, 1998, 175). 
Another factor that may have a limiting effect on the birth rate is that many people are 
not in favor of the existing hyper-competitive environment that has been created by the Japanese 
educational system. The heavy emphasis on educational success in the one-time school entrance 
examination is unfair in that it dictates a student's success in their future life (Boling, 1998, 179). 
Students face many examination pressures, because in order to enter a good university they have 
to reach a certain score in the school entrance examination and that is the only score that matters.  
The consequences of MacArthur’s decision to mandate that women have equal access to 
higher education had both positive and negative consequences for Japan. The positives are that it 
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established the idea of gender equality, closed the gender gap between men and women and gave 
women the same freedom as men in many aspects of society, from access to education, to 
unlimited future career opportunities. The Japanese economy was able to expand as the labor 
demand was met by working women. There was also one major negative impact of that social 
revolution.  When women are educated and become full participants in the labor force they 
invariably delay marriage and have fewer children. 
The sharp drop in the birth rate in Japan when combined with the aging trend, has had a 
serious immediate impact on the overall population. Japan’s total fertility rate first hit below two 
(2) in 1975 and then continued to drop. In 1990 it had dropped to one point fifty seven (1.57), 
and then to one point forty three (1.43) in 1995, one point thirty nine (1.39) in 1997 and one 
point thirty four (1.34) in 1999. In 2001, the Japanese newborn population was reduced by 
18,822 compared to 2000, and Japan’s fertility rate hit one point thirty three (1.33). Furthermore, 
the number of newborns in 2002 was just 1,156,000, a decrease of about 150,000 from the 
previous year (Wang, 2003, 129-130). 
The Current Number of Newborns and Its Impact in the Future 
According to the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2012 
report, the number of births in Japan will continue its downward trend and only intensify in the 
future. It is predicted that, in the next 50 years, the annual newborn population in Japan will 
experience a significant decline from 119 million in 2001 to 67 million in 2050. The Japanese 
population reached its peak of 127 million in 2006. After that the annual number of deaths began 
to exceed the number of births. In 2027, it is projected that Japan’s population will decline to 112 
million, and in 2040 the number will drop below 110 million. The Figure 1 clearly shown the as 
to 2014, the elder population is 26% out of the total population. Then, according to projections, 
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in 2050, the elderly population ratio would reach 38.8%, and the average life expectancy of 
Japanese men and women will reach 81 and 90 respectively as compared from 70 in 1970. This 
means that one in every three people will be an elder (Wang, 2013, 130). According to the Japan 
Statistical handbook of 2015, the social security spending has grown from 14,543 billion Yen in 
1995 to 31,530 billion Yen in 2015. The spending is most triple in the last 20 years, which is able 
equivalent to 33% of the total government expenditures. 
Figure 1 
 
The increase in the elderly population of Japan brings with it an increase in the number of 
elders who are dependent on the rest of the population for support and an increase in the 
financial burdens on the younger generation. As the population ages, more and more seniors 
retire from the workforce. They pay less tax and do not create any material wealth. However 
seniors continue to consume since they must address their daily needs and they require more 
medical and nursing care, which can be very costly.  Retirement pensions, medical costs, health 
care costs and social welfare costs are escalating rapidly in Japan. The working population must 
bear a disproportionate share of these costs and the problem is compounded since the growth in 
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the elderly population is far outpacing the rate at which younger people can contribute to the 
social security system. According to the projections already cited from the National Institution of 
Population and Social Security Research, if in 2050, every one of three people is an elder, then 
the other two Japanese people have to contribute enough to society to take care of this elder. In 
all likelihood, some of these people will be children, or students, so the actual workforce will 
carry the heaviest social burden. The continuation of this trend will seriously impact the future of 
retirement pensions, medical and other social benefit programs in Japan. Therefore, the Japanese 
quickly need to solve the problem and find a long-term solution that will help them both to fund 
elder care and to address the declining birth rate (Wang, 2013, 130). 
Immigration policy, Japan VS Australia and Canada  
Given the population shift and decline in Japan, one fundamental economic issue facing 
the country is the fact that the workforce is shrinking. One obvious strategic response to this 
would be to reform the country’s immigration policy.  If Japan was to welcome new immigrants, 
those immigrants could help bolster the shrinking workforce and boost the nation’s productivity. 
Many Western countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia have historically enacted 
immigration reforms when they need to admit new immigrants and solve labor shortages. 
Australia experienced an economic boom in the post-Second World War period, when, in 
1945, they welcomed about 6 million immigrants. Due to the continual arrival of new 
immigrants, the population of Australia has increased from 7 million people to over 20 million. 
As author Jock Collins stated in 1991, the immigration policy in Australia was used partly to fill 
labor shortages, and also, to add more people to the overall population. Charles Price, an 
Australian demographer, characterizes the country as one of the world’s quintessential 
immigration countries and indicated that the Australia economy acts like a hungry snake or boa 
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constrictor. It has a great appetite for immigrants during the economic boom years but slows 
down its intake of immigrants when faced with a recession.  During the post-war period, 
Australian immigration policy was primarily driven by the labor market, its purpose being to 
fulfill labor market needs (Collins, 2009, 1). 
A second post-war economic boom in Australia, driven primarily by globalization, has 
led to changes in immigration intakes and given rise to policies that are considered better suited 
to Australia’s new economic structure and growing labor needs (Collins, 2008, 244–266). The 
immigration policy initiatives now have four major parts that address both the domestic economy 
and globalization. The first change was to increase the number of permanent residents admitted 
to Australia in accordance with the needs of the business cycle. Secondly, the government chose 
to encourage more skilled and professional immigration rather than family migration (which was 
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s). To help solve specific labor shortages it created a list of 
occupations in demand so that certain professionals and skilled laborers would be given priority 
in their immigration status. Thirdly, Australia increased the number of temporary migrants to 
fulfill short-term labor needs. Lastly, the Australian authorities became more aware of the 
importance of greater security measures in its immigration screenings as a result of the events of 
9/11 and other terrorist acts.  The government’s crackdown on illegal immigrants has been 
uncompromising. . These four major immigration policy initiatives, which facilitate both 
permanent and temporary migration, have helped Australia address the labor shortages in the 
market and successfully participate in the new global economy (Collins, 2009, 2).   
Japan is one of several countries that face shortages in the labor market. Canada also 
faces a similar problem. According to Peter Veress, the president of Vermax Group, a company 
that recruits temporary foreign workers, the most obvious solution is immigration. Veress, who 
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served as a former officer of the Department of Immigration, has said that he is thrilled that he is 
the leader of a corporate immigration and international recruitment strategy company because of 
the opportunities it brings both for his company, for his clients and for countries who need 
skilled workers. Veress states that it is a win-win–win solution. He understands the 
underpinnings of Canada’s labor situation and cites the fact that population growth is negative, 
and the current population is aging. He also notes the greater demand for skilled and professional 
workers. Veress says his company effectively solves the labor shortage and skills shortage by 
recruiting temporary migrant workers (McNaughton, 2013, 1-4). Raj Sharma of Steward Sharma 
Harsanyi Immigration, Family, and Criminal Law states that to employ a foreign worker, a 
business needs to show the salary of foreign workers would not create a downward trend in the 
labor market. The company cannot just hire cheap foreign workers to replace Canadians. 
Additionally, they have to show that they have tried to recruit for the position and demonstrate 
that the foreign worker is not likely to take away a job from a qualified Canadian.  
Labor shortages can have a critical effect on business growth and development. One can 
cite the fact that one of the biggest Canadian Oil and Gas Company, in Alberta faces labor 
shortages that are expected to cost the company more than $33 billion over the next few years. 
The choice is simple. More foreign workers or the loss of $33 billion in taxable dollars.  For 
most Canadian capitalists, it is a quick, simple choice (McNaughton, 2013, 5-8).  
Canada and Australia faced labor shortages just as Japan does today and the experience 
of both countries suggests that overhauling immigration policies might be a solution to the labor 
shortage in the Japanese market. However, there is significantly different between Australia, 
Canada and Japan, in that Australia and Canada have historically been known as countries built 
on immigration, whereas Japan is not. Immigration reform in these two Western countries was 
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supported both by the government and its people.  Japan has never been thought of as a country 
that either welcomes or needs immigrant.  The issue of immigration has been in the background 
for decades. Now, however, a combination of economic and demographic changes has brought 
the immigration issue to the forefront of Japanese policy debate as well as to the public’s 
attention (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000, 9). 
Historically, Japan has always been a homogenous society with a singular culture and 
unique traditions. It did not welcome international migration in the post war period and its 
governmental policies rarely permit foreigners to become Japanese nationals. Due Japan’s 200 
years of isolation periods, which not until 1835 when the United State came and connect the 
Japan with rest of the world (U.S Department of the State, Office Of the Historian Milestones: 
1830-1860) Of course, if the Japanese were to rethink these policies it would have a significant 
impact. Current population trends show an approximately 38% decline in every generation since 
the 1970s. If this population gap is filled by immigration, the majority of the Japanese population 
will be foreign born after only two generations (Retherford and Ogawa, 2006, 35). Therefore, the 
Japanese government has taken both direct and indirect actions to limit and tighten immigration 
policies while still trying to manage the gaps in their labor force.  Primarily policy makers have 
depended on three strategies that have met with varying degrees of success. First, Japan has 
systematically pursued foreign investments and relocated a great number of production and 
assembly jobs overseas, so as to offer some relief from the labor pressure in Japan. Secondly, 
Japan made extensive amendments to the 1952 immigration laws in order to welcome certain 
categories of foreign workers into the country. These changes expanded new temporary 
immigration categories and were designed to encourage foreign workers with in-demand skills to 
pursue their professions in Japan.  Changes in the 1990 immigration law also permitted people of 
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Japanese descent who are living aboard to immigrate to Japan, and provided additional rights, 
job-training programs and other benefits to the children and foreign spouses of Japanese citizens. 
The change of this immigration law has attracted about 300,000 Japanese Diasporas to come to 
Japan and work and most of them come from South America countries, such as Brazil. 
(Kingsberg). This tightly controlled and limited expansion of Japan’s immigration system not 
only helped fill some of the vacancies in the labor market, it also helped fulfill some of Japan’s 
obligations under the International Trading Regime. Thirdly, the Japanese authorities allowed a 
significant number of foreigners in the 1990s to work without legal documentation in many of 
the secondary labor markets and in the underground economy. The Japanese government, 
however, remains committed to prosecuting illegal immigrants and currently demands that all 
workers present appropriate documentation of their eligibility to work. Without it they face 
deportation (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000, 2-4). 
These three strategies successfully limited the number of immigrants entering Japan 
while providing some flexibility around foreign labor, however they did not address the central 
issue of massive labor shortages in a way that made sense for the long term (Papademetriou and 
Hamilton, 2000, 2-4). Many Asian immigrants consider Japan to be an attractive destination, 
especially since Japanese wages are often much higher than those in their own countries.  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that 
pension expenses will double from 1995 to 2020.With social costs like these rising, immigration 
seems to be the only sure way that Japan can stay both internationally competitive and address 
the domestic costs of population decline. However, the issue is not a simple one. Japan has not 
been welcoming to immigrants since the Japanese have a deeply rooted sense of social and 
cultural identity and tend to alienate outsiders. This attitude has influenced and limited 
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immigration policy (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000, 7). While labor shortages have led 
Japan to reconsider temporary migration, many Japanese remain fundamentally opposed to 
allowing more permanent immigration (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000, 47). This attitude 
will take time to change. However change is possible. Even though, the overall foreign 
population is about 1.6% of the total population in Japan, one of the lowest of the industrialized 
countries, the number of foreigners was increasing up until 2008.  Then the global economic 
crisis and the Earthquake of 2011 lead to a decrease in the number of foreigners. However the 
number of permanent foreign residents is slowly increasing and in 2011 there were one million 
foreigners in Japan (National Institute of Population and Society Security Research, 2014, 3).  
Family incentives policies since 1970s  
While Japanese population decline and labor shortages can be addressed by changes in 
the immigration policy and increased admission of both temporary and permanent residents, the 
government has also tried to intervene by introducing policies that incentivize Japanese couples 
to have more children.. The following chart (Table 3) illustrates some of the family incentive 
policies the central government has enacted over the years.  
Table 3 
 
Total Fertility Rate Year Government Policies
2.14 1972 Establishment of the Child Allowances
1.54 1991 Enactment of Children Leave Act 
1.53 1994 Announcement of Angel Paln for 1995-1999
1.5 1995 Enactment of Childcare and Familly Care Leave Act 
1.42 1999 Announcement of New Angel Plan 2000-04
1.34 2001 Amendment to the Employment Insurance Law 
1.33 2002 Annoucement of "Plus One" Plan 
1.29 2003 Child Welfare Law 
1.29 2004 Announcement of New Angel Plan 2005-09
1.39 2010 Child Allowance 
25 
 
Sources: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research of 2003 at the Robert D. 
Retherford and Naohiro Ogawa, 2005. Total Fertility Rates were accessed from the World Bank 
Data of Total Fertility Rate of Japan. The 2003 Child Welfare Law was taken from Child Related 
Polices in Japan in 2003. The last two recent Child Allowances were from the 2014 Report of 
Social Security in Japan from National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.  
 
The Japanese government employed family incentive policies as early as 1972, when it 
established child allowances. At that time, the total fertility rate of two point fourteen (2.14) 
helped maintain Japan’s population at a time when the economy was still growing. The child 
allowance was a lifeline for lower-income couples that wanted to raise a third child. The cost of 
the child allowances was funded by all levels of the government, as well as by employers. This 
allowance was expanded to cover the second child in 1986, then the first child in 1992. In 1992, 
the aim of the government was simply to encourage more births in Japan (Retherford and 
Ogawa, 2005, 26).  
In 1990, the Japanese government established the inter-ministry committee of “Creating a 
Sound Environment for Bearing and Rearing Children” to concentrate on improving the lives 
and circumstances of couples who wanted to have children.  Under this committee, the Childcare 
Leave Act was enacted on April 1st, 1992. The law stated that either the mother or father of a 
newborn infant could take up to one year of unpaid leave, if they qualified as a full-time 
employee. Temporary workers and part-time workers were not included in the law. The goal of 
this law was to make child rearing easier for working women who had to juggle responsibilities 
for their children and their careers. The law directly affected companies and organizations that 
had more than 30 employees.  Companies and organizations with less than 30 employees were 
able to opt out of the law until 1995. However, the law did not establish any consequences for 
noncompliance.  As a result it did not have a significant impact on increasing births as shown in 
the total fertility rate of one point five (1.5) (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 27-28). 
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In 1994, the Ministry of Health and Welfare introduced an emergency five-year proposal 
to improve daycare services. One year later, in 1995 the plan was expanded to a ten-year plan 
with an assist from the Labor, Construction and Education Ministries. The plan was officially 
known as the plan on “Basic Direction for Future Childrearing Support Measures, but it also 
came to be known as the ‘Angel Plan’ (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 29). The plan was 
conceived to create support measures that would help women balance their work and home lives, 
it provided governmental support to help families raise children and offered inexpensive housing 
to some families with children. The plan was intended to create a child-friendly environment in 
Japan and to relieve some of the financial burdens associated with child rearing (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Child Related Polices in Japan, 14). It 
sought to expand day care service centers and reduce work hours for parents. The number of day 
care centers that offered infant services was increased by a third, with centers offering longer 
hours. Centers that offered temporary or drop-in care were expanded seven fold. There was also 
an increase in the number of centers that cared for sick infants, a doubling of the number of after-
school, day care centers, and increases in the number of regional centers offering child-raising 
support (Boling, 1998, 5). These newly established daycare centers were funded by the local 
government and with appropriations from the national government and the annual budget of the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 29). The fee for these centers 
varied by location and the services they offered were extensive. Some centers provided pick up 
services from parents’ homes or local schools; others provided medical care for sick children in 
the event that a parent could not pick up their child immediately (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 
29). 
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As in the child allowance model, the Angel Plan’s services were income-based. Couples 
who earned more paid more.  The eligibility criteria also varied by region and by demand. In 
rural areas, where demand for the services was low, the eligibility requirements were more 
relaxed as local governments attempted to attract more couples to use the services.  In some 
urban areas, where demand was high, supply was low and there were long waiting lists for every 
day care spot, many couples with higher incomes simply did not qualify for services (Retherford 
and Ogawa, 2005, 29). Lastly, Japan provided free counseling and back up child care support to 
first-time parents, especially to couples who were living far away from their families (Boling, 
1998, 5). As the result of the Angel Plan, the capacity of daycare centers for children zero to two 
jumped to 564,000 in 1999 from 451,000 in 1994 (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 28). 
The Childcare and Family Care Leave Act of 1995 replaced the 1991 Childcare Leave 
Act. Under this new act, full-time workers were granted up to a year of leave for either childcare 
or to take care of sick family members. Additionally, employees were able to receive 25% of 
their regular salary. These benefits would be provided by the National Employment Insurance 
Scheme which had first been created by the central government for the purpose of paying 
unemployment benefits. (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 29).  
The ‘few children’ crisis was broadly debated in the public; however, the issue was not 
receiving the same level of responsiveness and attention as that given to the aging of Japanese 
society. The Angel Plan and the Parental Leave Act had great aims, but the government did not 
provide sufficient funding to assure the success of the policies and they also did not create 
appropriate mechanisms to outlaw discrimination against women with children or pregnant 
employees (Boling, 1998, 184). Some believed that there was simply not enough money to 
support both elder care and childcare adequately (Boling, 1998, 178). By late 1996, officials 
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began to realize that the Angel Plan was unable to fulfill its mission, since local governments 
could not provide the proper amount of funding to support the plan. In October 1996, The 
Ministry of Health and Welfare declared that the day care center expansion program would be 
curtailed and services would be cut, in certain cases by half (Boling, 1998, 177). 
In 1999, a new version of the Angel Plan, the New Angel Plan of 2000 to 2004, officially 
known as the “Basic Principle to Cope with the Fewer Number of Children” was introduced. It 
addressed more specific intentions and goals in the areas of employment, childcare, health 
education and housing with eight listed measures. These included:  more easily accessible 
daycare centers and childcare services;   more child-friendly work environments; a proposal to 
address changing the traditional view of gender roles and “work first” attitudes in the workplace:  
an improvement in maternal and child health services; a proposal to improve local educational 
environments and reduce the financial burden on families created by the education of children, 
and lastly an emphasis on creating child-friendly housing and public facilities for children to play 
(National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Child Related Polices in Japan, 
15). It further expanded the number of daycare centers and the capacity of the centers for zero to 
two year-old children. The number of day care centers increased from 456,000 in 1990 to 
664,000 in 2002. After-school sport and other activities also expanded nationwide with 671,000 
children enrolled in 2003. Moreover, it led to the expansion of family supports centers from 82 in 
2000 to 286 in 2002. By 2003, about 307 cities and towns received government funding to 
support the improvement of babysitting services (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 29).  
A new amendment was adopted to the Employment Insurance Law. It again sought to 
make it easier for employees to take family leave in order to care for their children or family 
members. Under this insurance law, full-time employees were eligible to receive up to 40% of 
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their salary rather than 25%. The benefit was still provided under the National Employment 
Insurance Scheme. However, this law effectively began to discourage employers from hiring 
women as full-time, employees. The statistics show that between the years of 2000 to 2004, the 
number of married women, under age 50 who were employed as full-time employees dropped 
significantly and the number of part-time workers increased. This trend suggested that married 
women would have a harder time securing full-time employment in the future (Retherford and 
Ogawa, 2005, 31). It can be safe to assume that such employment trends might have further 
discouraged women from getting married and raising children in their 20s, further delaying the 
marriage age. The benefit also created a situation where women who did want to have children 
would be more likely to have to find part time rather than full time work (Retherford and Ogawa, 
2005, 31). In one way, the purpose of government, which was to help working women be able to 
take child leave backfired. The government actually created a system that discouraged employers 
from hiring women, especially potential mothers, as full time employees.  
In 2003, the Child Welfare Law was amended. The new law was designed to address the 
welfare of all children, not just children whose parents needed access to affordable childcare. 
Under the law, local governments were asked to support childcare activities and provide services 
such as counseling for parents, day care centers and childminders (National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research, Child Related Polices in Japan, 17). 
Another plan known as “Plus One” officially known as the “Measure to Cope with a 
Fewer Number of Children Plus One” was announced in 2002. The government believed that 
one of the major factors contributing to the low birth rate was the fact that fathers were 
essentially nonparticipants when it came to the issue of child rearing. The plus one suggested that 
women would need help in addition to any that might be given by their husbands, and the plan 
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was also designed to encourage men to play a bigger role in the process of raising children. The 
plan set out provisions that men could take at least five days of paternal leave from work when 
their wife gave birth. It also intended to encourage all full-time employees, not just women to 
take childcare leave. The hope was that the plan could encourage parents, especially men to 
reduce their work hours so that they might bear more responsibility for child rearing. The New 
Angel Plan of 2005 to 2009 wanted to increase the amount of time men spent on their children 
and on housework by at least 2 hours and to reduce the amount of overtime worked by men in 
their 30s by 25% in the week. Additionally, the plan expanded the number of family day care 
centers from 358 in 2005 to 710 in 2010 (Retherford and Ogawa, 2005, 33-34). Additionally, the 
plan stated that at least 25% of the eligible men and women who have pre-school age children 
should be granted more flexible working schedules and shorter hours. The Plus One was 
announced in 2002 and two laws that supported the plan goals were put in place in 2003. One 
was the Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation and two was the 
Law for Basic Measures to Cope with a Declining Fertility Society (Retherford and Ogawa, 
2005, 32).  
The New Generation law targeted large companies with more than 300 workers, no 
matter if they are full-time, part-time or contract workers. Any employee who had been working 
for the company for more than a year was protected under this law. The law called for companies 
to submit a plan to create a family-friendly workplace and to help raise fertility levels and 
encourage more births among their employees. The plan was to be submitted to local 
government by the time the law was put into effect in 2005. Though no penalties for 
noncompliance were stated, companies were urged to submit proposals and address the issue 
within the next two to five years. When the action plan was approved the employer would 
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receive a government logo that could be used in advertising campaigns. The process of the plan 
was to be evaluated by the Labor Bureau in local government and receive direction from the 
Ministry of Health in central government. The target of the law was to increase the percentage to 
25% of both men and women who take childcare leave. By doing this the government was 
hoping to change the workaholic atmosphere of the workplace and allow employees to feel more 
comfortable in taking time off for childcare leave. The Basic Measure Law did not indicate an 
action to be taken, but rather set the stage for a future act of the government with the goal of 
creating more child-friendly environment both inside and outside of the workplace (Retherford 
and Ogawa, 2005, 33-34).  
 Since 2010, the Japanese government has worked to create a universal child allowance 
regardless of income to encourage young couples to raise the child. The child allowances are 
designed to provide direct monetary child support for families with children 15 and younger. 
With this goal in mind, various kinds of child allowances have been established over the years. 
The child allowance that provides monetary support for families with children 15 and younger 
has increased from 5000 Yen to 15000 Yen (100 Yen is relatively equal to 1 US dollar). There is 
also an allowance for single-parent household and parents of children with disabilities. Each 
child allowance has different requirement for eligibilities (National Institution for Population and 
Social Security Research, Social Security in 2014). 
Conclusion 
Japan has attempted to address the issue of its declining birth rates and super aging 
society by making changes to its immigration policy and to its family incentive policies. Going 
forward, both policies have their advantages and weaknesses. The advantage of future reforms to 
the immigration policy is that if Japan were to open its doors to more immigrants, it would 
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immediately solve the problem of the country’s shrinking of working workforce. However, the 
disadvantage is Japan would need to accept about 600,000 immigrants per year, which currently 
is not feasible both politically and culturally. However, one alternative would be to increase the 
number of international students allowed into Japan and extend the visas of students who pursue 
a professional degree in Japan. Additionally, it could relax the restrictions currently on these 
students allowing them both to live and work in Japan permanently. The college student 
population would be the ideal immigration population of Japan because this demographic has 
specialty and professional skills that are currently in demand in the Japanese workforce. Second, 
they are eager to learn and be part of the Japanese culture. The international students are majority 
come other Asian countries like China, Vietnam, Korea, Nepal and Taiwan. (Independent 
Administrative Institution of International student in Japan 2015)  Most of the international 
students who study in Japan are interested in learning more about Japanese ways and are open to 
adopting Japanese culture (Wang, 2013, 134).  
Family incentive policies are designed to encourage domestic young couples to have 
more children and to elevate the birth rate in Japan. Unfortunately, various family incentive 
policies that have been put in place in Japan have not been effective. The total fertility rate has 
remained low for decades. The problem with Japan’s approach to its family incentive programs 
is that it was a very fragmented approach with different policies designed to attack different 
problems and different stages (Demeny, 1972, 147–161). For example, the enactment of the 
Childcare and Family Leave Act, which  allowed  full-time employees to take up to a year’s 
leave to take care of a child or family member and which promised 25% to 50% of the salary 
back during the period, backfired. Employers found the policy expensive and this created more 
gender discrimination toward young women interested in taking full-time positions. Also, the 
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essential goal of the overall Angel Plan was to expand the number of day care centers. The 
expansion of the day care centers, however only solved certain pressures for working women 
with children. It did not encourage couples that do not have children to decide to have a child. 
The ambitious goal to expand access to day centers was also compromised by the fact that the 
government lacked adequate funding to reach its goal. This did not inspire confidence in the 
policy. Overall, the most effective policy was that which awarded child allowances to young 
couples and helped people who thought they could not afford to have children start families. 
However, the initial child allowance was set at around 5000 yen per month. Given the extremely 
high costs of education 5000 yen is not a very strong incentive. The current child allowance, 
which increased to about 15,000 yen per month in 2012, is a more credible reflection of the 
average monthly childcare expenses (Aoki, 2012, 9). 
The best solution for the Japanese government if it wishes to alleviate the population 
crisis and change the demographic shift is to take advantages of both immigration policies and 
family incentive policies. On the one hand, Japan can increase the number of international 
students they accept and relax immigration restrictions for workers who have professional skills, 
such as nursing, medical, etc. that are in high demand. On the other hand, the Japanese 
government must still place a huge emphasis on encouraging more births through family 
incentive policies, such as the Child Allowance. Only by employing aggressive interventions will 
the Japanese government be able to change its demographic trends, control immigration, assure 
an adequate workforce and increase the number of Japanese births. 
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